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The Persistence of National Peculiarities:
Translating Representative Environmental
Action from Transnational into German Law
ANNA KATHARINA MANGOLD*
ABSTRACT
This paper explores representative environmental action in
international, European Union, and German environmental law as an
example of '7egal translation." The Aarhus Convention, dating from
1998, requests signatory parties to provide environmental NGOs with
wide access to justice so that the protection of the environment can be
controlled by the judiciary. Both the European Union and Germany have
implemented the provisions of the Aarhus Convention into their
respective legal orders. This process of implementation can be considered
as "legal translations." The argument of this paper is that a perspective
of '7egal translation" provides new vistas on the various intertwined
layers of law constituting transnational environmental law. First, the
example of representative environmental action shows how important
context is for legal translations: the traditional German "impairment of
rights doctrine" (Schutznormtheorie), historically developed in the
nineteenth century, has still major importance in German administrative
law and has to be taken into account when translating the Aarhus
Convention. Secondly, legal translations take place in judicial
hierarchies: both the Court of Justice of the European Union and the
Compliance Committee of the Aarhus Convention have ruled upon
Germany's translation of representative environmental action and found
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it wanting; yet, the picture is much more complex and nuanced than the
usage of "hierarchy" suggests, as a closer look reveals. Thirdly, literal
translations are the basis of legal translations: in transnational law,
multiple languages have to be literally translated, both on a European
and an international level. Fourthly, the example of representative
environmental action demonstrates the persistence of national
peculiarities: after all, national peculiarities cannot too easily be
overcome or abandoned; rather, they continue to play a significant role in
transnational law.
INTRODUCTION
Who is to speak for the environment? Since the 1990s, international
law has pursued the goal of empowering nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) to raise awareness of environmental concerns by
providing them with access to justice. International law, namely the Rio
Declaration of 1992 and the Aarhus Convention of 1998, demands
signatory parties enable environmental NGOs to participate in
administrative procedures and request judicial review of resulting
administrative decisions. The legal mechanism used to empower NGOs
is representative environmental action.1 Signatory parties to these
international treaties have to implement representative environmental
action into domestic law. In addition to international law, the European
Union also tries to strengthen representative environmental action. As
one of the driving forces behind the Aarhus Convention, the European
Union obliges its Member States to implement representative
environmental action into their domestic law. Both international and
European law necessitate highly complex processes of implementation
into domestic law. As a result, a body of interconnected environmental
law of international, supranational, and national origin develops; the
emerging body of law can be called transnational.2
1. "Representative environmental action" is a literal translation of the German term
"Umweltverbandsklage." Another possible translation of "Umweltverbandsklage" is "public
interest standing for environmental NGOs." For the sake of brevity, the literal translation,
representative environmental action, will be used throughout the article.
2. See Veerle Heyvaert & Thijs Etty, Introducing Transnational Environmental Law,
1 TRANSNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 1, 3 (2012), available at http://journals.cambridge
.org/abstractS2047102512000027. For a theoretical concept of transnational law, see
generally Peer Zumbansen, Transnational Law, Evolving, ELGAR ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
COMPARATIVE LAW 898-925 (Jan Smits ed., 2d Ed. 2012) (reviewing the evolution of
transnational law and its relevance in legal fields); Peer Zumbansen, Defining the Space of
Transnational Law: Legal Theory, Global Governance & Legal Pluralism, in BEYOND
TERRITORIALITY: TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL AUTHORITY IN AN AGE OF GLOBALIZATION 53
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This article traces the implementation of representative
environmental action for NGOs into domestic law using Germany as an
example. Many actors, institutions, levels of legal regulation, and courts
have to be considered. Environmental NGOs enter the stage as new
protagonists, which have traditionally been neglected in international
law.
The perspective of translation is used to describe and unfold the
complex interrelated and interdependent processes of legislation at
different levels, both national and international. Translation proves to
be an immensely helpful analytical tool to unfold a highly complex
interaction between legal regimes. While the expression "regulatory
translations" could indicate translations between regulatory regimes,
such as economic, environmental, societal, legal, or human rights
regimes, this article uses "regulatory translations" to refer to
translations between legal regulations of different origin. The
translations considered in this article remain purely within the legal
realm; they are translations between laws of different origin,
hierarchical standing, and mechanisms of enforcement. Translating
access to justice for environmental NGOs from transnational legal
regimes into German law shows the multipolar, complex, and
interwoven processes involved in translations between legal spheres.
Looking at the implementation of representative environmental
action into German law through the lens of translation, the complexities
of transnational law and, more generally, the contradictions within the
law appear more clearly. Processes of translation between international
law, supranational European Union (EU) law, and national law do not
always follow a strictly hierarchical path, nor do they adhere to
traditional conceptions of international law versus national law. In
analyzing legal translations, the notion of "the law" as a supposedly
stable entity can be unpacked, revealing a much more nuanced and
complicated picture.
The main argument of this article is that the national level remains
of decisive importance even in times of transnational law: national
peculiarities persist. Transnational trajectories are destined to collide
with national peculiarities if the latter are not sufficiently taken into
account. Therefore, legal translations need to be contextual translations,
national peculiarities being the context in which legal translations
occur. One such national peculiarity is the German "individual public
right." Stemming from the nineteenth century, it continues to shape
administrative judicial review in Germany, resulting in a highly
(Giinther Handl, Joachim Zekoll, & Peter Zumbansen eds., 2012) (discussing the
emergence of transnational law and the future of law and globalization).
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individualized system of judicial review. This article shows how
insufficiently contextualized legal translation resulted in a predictable
collision of transnational and German law. Observation of this collision
helps identify characteristic features of legal translations.
Just as literary translations take place in specific contexts, so too do
translations between legal spheres. Thus, in the first part of the article,
the specific context of translating representative environmental action
is unfolded, namely the peculiar German "individual public right"
dating back to the nineteenth century. In a highly individualized system
of judicial review such as Germany's, representative environmental
action seems foreign, not belonging into the "original" system.
Literary translations have a text that is translated and so do
translations of legal regulations. The second part of the article explores
text(s) regulating representative environmental action that are
translated into German law: the Aarhus Convention of 1998 and
subsequent EU law implementing it. Interestingly, Germany was a
party to the treaty negotiations that eventually led to the Aarhus
Convention and is an influential Member State of the European Union.
The third part of the article traces attempts to translate
representative environmental action from the Aarhus Convention and
EU law into German law. The first attempt failed spectacularly in May
2011 when the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) decided
that the German implementation was inadequate.3 In April 2013, the
second attempt at translation was promulgated.4 However, the Aarhus
Compliance Committee in a recent draft finding from November 2013
still finds the new promulgation wanting.5
The conclusion of this article highlights some characteristics of
translations of legal texts. Literary translations and legal translations
share certain features, such as necessities to translate from one
language to another. Translations of legal regulations, however, also
display characteristics inherent to legal mechanisms such as hierarchy
and control. This article advances a nuanced view of the sophisticated
circumstances under which legal translations occur.
3. Case C-115/09, Bund fir Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland, Landesverband
Nordrhein-Westfalen eV v. Bezirksregierung Arnsberg, 2011 E.C.R. 1-3676.
4. See Gesetz iber ergiinzende Vorschriften zu Rechtsbehelfen in Umweltangelegenheiten
nach der EG-Richtlininie 2003/351EG [Law on Supplementary Rules to Appeals in
Environmental Matters According to the EC Directive 2003/35/EG], Umwelt-
Rechtsbehelfsgesetz [UmwRG] [Environmental Appeals Act], Apr. 8, 2013, BGBl. I at 753
(Ger.).
5. ClientEarth v. Germany, UNECE Case No. ACCC/C/2008131 (filed Dec. 1, 2008)
[hereinafter ClientEarth Complaint] (Draft Findings filed Nov. 11, 2013), available at
http://www.unece.orglenv/pp/compliance/Compliancecommittee/3lTableGermany.html.
226
THE PERSISTENCE OF NATIONAL PECULIARITIES
I. TRANSLATING IN CONTEXT: THE PECULIAR GERMAN "INDIVIDUAL
PUBLIC RIGHT"
Words always carry connotations. The use of certain words triggers
cascades of images, connections, and associations. Connotations
essentially mean context. When translating words, the most difficult
problem is to capture the context of a word. This is not only true for
literary translations but also for translations of legal words, terms, and
expressions.
This article is about-inter alia-German legal regulation of
representative environmental action and, yet, it is written in English.
Since legal concepts are highly dependent on their context, it is not
sufficient to provide literal translations from German into English.
Instead, it is necessary to explain the core concept of German
administrative judicial review in its context: the "subjektives dffentliches
Recht" (preliminary literal translation: "individual public right"). The
"individual public right" provides a key to unlock the door behind which
legal, exchanges and battles over translations of representative
environmental action into German law take place. To offer sufficient
context for understanding this key concept, (A) a narrative of the
politico-historical development of "individual public right" is told, (B)
before the current German legislation on administrative judicial review
can be presented, (C) as well as the regulation of representative
environmental action prior to the Aarhus Convention, and (D) to
summarize, it becomes discernible how the German administration and
its control by administrative judiciary traditionally function.
A. The Historical Development of "Subjektives dffentliches Recht"
The expression "subjektives 6ffentliches Recht" is utterly foreign to
Anglo-American law, which is why there is no exact English translation
of the term. One can, however, find quite a few propositions for a
translation: "subjective right vis-A-vis the public authorities," "personal
227
228 INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 21:1
right," "individual right,"6 or "subjective-public law."7 To clarify its
meaning, one has to consider German legal history.8
"Individual public right" was conceptualized as a corresponding
term for the traditional "private right." A "private right" regulates
relations between private individuals or entities, or even more broadly,
participants in legal transactions in the private realm (e.g., the
market).9 By contrast, an "individual public right" is directed against
the state and gives individuals (or private entities) a legal right vis-A-vis
the state. The concept was developed in the liberal constitutional
monarchy of the late nineteenth century at a time when the judiciary
provided shelter for citizens' rights against the monarchic executive.' 0
Generally, one can conceive of two ways to theorize judicial review,
and leading jurists of the nineteenth century have supported both.
According to the Prussian scholar of administrative law, Rudolf von
Gneist," the law creates an objective order; the role of the
administrative judiciary is not only to protect individuals but also to
6. Examples taken from various EU documents. See, e.g., 2005 O.J. (C 281) 6-7
C'subjective right vis-a-vis the public authorities"); KLAUS-DIETER BORCHARDT, THE ABC
OF EUROPEAN UNION LAW 93 (2010) ("personal right"), available at http://europa.euldocu
mentationlegislation/pdf/oa81O7147-en.pdf; Case C-540/03, Parliament v. Council, 2006
E.C.R. 1-5809, 59 ("individual right").
7. MICHAEL STOLLEIS, A HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAW IN GERMANY 1914-1945, at 344
(Thomas Dunlap trans., 2004).
8. For a profound historical overview, see generally HARTMUT BAUER, GESCHICHTLICHE
GRUNDLAGEN DER LEHRE VOM SUBJEKTIVEN OFFENTLICHEN RECHT [HISTORICAL BASES OF
THE DOCTRINE OF THE SUBJECTIVE PUBLIC RIGHT] (1986) (Ger.); WILHELM HENKE, DAS
SUBJEKTIVE OFFENTLICHE RECHT [THE SUBJECTIVE PUBLIC RIGHT] (1968) (Ger.).
9. See GEORG JELLINEK, SYSTEM DER SUBJEKTIVEN OFFENTLICHEN RECHTE [SYSTEM
OF THE SUBJECTIVE PUBLIC RIGHTS] 54-67 (2d ed. 1905) (Ger.) (describing "Offentliches
und privates subjektives Recht"-public and private individual right).
10. See MARTIN ROTT, DAs VERWALTUNGSRECHTLICHE SUBJEKTIVE OFFENTLICHE RECHT
IM SPIEGEL SEINER ENTWICKLUNG IM DEUTSCHEN LIBERALEN RECHTSSTAAT UND IN DER
FRANZOSISCHEN 'THeORIE DES DROITS SUBJECTIFS DES ADMINISTRES [THE ADMINISTRATIVE
SUBJECTIVE PUBLIC RIGHT IN THE MIRROR OF ITS DEVELOPMENT IN THE GERMAN LIBERAL
CONSTITUTIONAL STATE AND IN THE FRENCH "THEORY OF THE SUBJECTIVE RIGHTS OF THE
ADMINISTRATION"] 88-137 (1976) (Ger.).
11. See generally ERICH J. HAHN, RUDOLF VON GNEIST 1816-1895: EIN POLITISCHER
JURIST IN DER BISMARCKZEIT [A POLITICAL LAWYER IN THE BISMARCK TIME] (1995) (Ger.)
(providing insights into the life of von Gneist); Christoph Schbnberger. Rudolf von Gneist
(1816-1895): Die altenglische Verwaltung als Vorbild ffir den preuischen Rechtsstaat [The
Old-English Administration as a Model for the Prussian Constitutional State], in
FESTSCHRIFT 200 JAHRE JURISTISCHE FAKULTAT DER HUMBOLDT-UNIVERSITAT ZU BERLIN:
GESCHICHTE, GEGENWART UND ZUKUNKT [ANNIVERSARY PUBLICATION 200 YEARS LEGAL
FACULTY OF THE HUMBOLDT UNIVERSITY TO BERLIN: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE] 241
(Stefan Grundmann et al. eds., 2010) (Ger.) (detailing the influence of English
administration on von Gneist).
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objectively control the administration. 12 Such objective control leads to
the protection of individual citizens; hence, legal action of individual
citizens is only taken as a starting point. According to von Gneist, a
claimant needs to show a specific interest in bringing the -action
(Klagebefugnis-locus standi), so that the formal positions of claimant
and respondent can be performed; the claimant does not need, however,
to show an "individual public right."'3 The second competing approach,
as represented by Otto von Sarwey and Otto Bdhr, held that the
protection of individual rights was the nodal point.14 Individual rights,
as developed in general legal theory, existed both in private and in
public law and were "generically not different."15 The protection of
individual rights would eventually lead to the correction of wrong
administrative decisions. In the end, the second approach prevailed and
"individual public rights" became the crux of administrative judicial
review in Germany.
The dispute was historically relevant, especially for the introduction
of a special administrative judiciary. It is important to keep in mind
that, until the middle of the nineteenth century, the courts had not
controlled the administration in Germany. The administration only
granted recourse ("Rekurs') to the next higher level of administration:
control stayed within the administration until the administrative
judiciary was introduced (first in 1863 in the Grand-Duchy of Baden).16
12. See RULDOLF VON GNEIST, DER RECHTSSTAAT UND DIE VERWALTUNGSGERICHTE IN
DEUTSCHLAND [THE STATE OF RULE OF LAW AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURTS IN
GERMANY] 270 (2d ed. 1879) (Ger.). See also DIETER LORENZ, VERWALTUNGSPROZE3RECHT
[ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURAL LAW] 9 (2000) (Ger.) (presenting the common historical
account of the divergence of theories of judicial review).
13. See GNEIST, supra note 12, at 271.
14. See generally OTTO VON SARwEY, DAS OFFENTLICHE RECHT UND DIE
VERWALTUNGSRECHTSPFLEGE [THE PUBLIC RIGHT AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE JURISDICTION]
(1880) (Ger.). See also OTTO BAHR, DER RECHTSSTAAT: EINE PUBLICISTISCHE SKIZZE [THE
STATE OF RULE OF LAW: A PUBLIC SKETCH] (1864) (Ger.); CARL FRIEDRICH WILHELM VON
GERBER, UEBER OEFFENTLICHE RECHTE [ABOuT PUBLIC RIGHTS] (1852) (Ger.) (initiating the
debate between theories of judicial review).
15. See BAHR, supra note 14, at 46 ("generisch nicht verschieden').
16. The question was whether the administration should control itself in an inner-
administrative procedure with participation of citizens, see Gneist, supra note 12, or whether
the general judiciary should control the administration, see Sarwey, supra note 14 and Bahr,
supra note 14. As the first state, Baden introduced an administrative judiciary in 1863. For a
historical perspective, see WOLFGANG KOHL, DAS REICHSVERWALTUNGSGERICHT: EIN BEIRAG
zuR ENTWICKLUNG DER VERWALTUNGSGERICHTSBARKEIT IN DEUTSCHLAND [THE REICH
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT: A CONTRIBUTION TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE
IN GERMANY] 9-104 (1991) (Ger.) (describing the development of the administrative judiciary in
Germany before 1933); GERNOT SYDow, DIE VERWALTUNGSGERICHTSBARKEIT DES
AUSGEHENDEN 19. JAHRHUNDERTS: EINE QUELLENSTUDIE Zu BADEN WORTrEMBERG UND
BAYERN [THE ADMINISTRATIVE JURISDICTION OF THE LATE 19TH CENTURY: A SOURCE BASED
229
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It is, therefore, out of the question to simplistically judge the' described
development as either "good" or "bad" as a historicist understanding of
historical developments possibly could be tempted to do. Rather, it is the
specific and peculiar German development toward judicial control of
administration, grounded in "individual public rights."
B. Current German Regulation of the "Individual Public Right"
After the experience of the Third Reich and national socialism,
during which judicial protection against acts of public authorities was
withheld,17 it was considered of major importance to guarantee a
general right of access to justice against acts of public authority in the
newly founded Federal Republic of Germany. Consequently, such a right
was incorporated in the German Constitution, the Grundgesetz (Basic
Law, abbreviated as GG), namely in its Article 19(4), which states:
"Should any person's rights be impaired by public authority, he may
appeal to the courts . ...
The constitutional provision is enunciated in Section 42 of the
Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung (Code of Administrative Court Procedure,
abbreviated as VwGO) 19 and particularly in subparagraph 2:
(1) An action can seek to have an administrative
measure set aside (action for annulment) or to have the
STUDY OF BADEN-WURTTEMBERG AND BAVARIA] (2000) (Ger.) (providing a historical perspective
of Baden as the first state to introduce administrative judiciary in 1863); CARL H. ULE, RUDOLF
VON GNEISTS BEDEUTUNG FUR DIE EINFUHRUNG DER VERWALTUNGSGERICHTSBARKEIT IN
PREU8EN [GNEIsT's SIGNIFICANCE FOR THE INTRODUCTION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
JURISDICTION IN PRUSSIA] (1998) (Ger.) (detailing von Gneist's influence on the introduction of
administrative justice in Prussia).
17. For a justification of "Justizfreie Hoheitsakte" (state acts against which no judicial
remedy was available) in the times of the Nazi regime, compare HANS PETER IPSEN,
POLITIK UND JusTIZ: DAs PROBLEM DER JUSTIZLOSEN HOHEITSAKTE [POLITICS AND
JUSTICE: THE PROBLEM OF POLITICAL ACTS WITHOUT JUDICIAL CONTROL] (1937) (Ger.)
(arguing that it is possible to evade the problems of the Dual State by shifting the
problems from substantive law to jurisdictional implementation), with ERNST FRAENKEL,
THE DUAL STATE: A CONTRIBUTION TO THE THEORY OF DICTATORSHIP 147-49 (E. A. Shils
et al. trans., 1969) (stating that Ipsen's views formalistically evade the discrimination
brought about by Justizfreie Hoheitsakte').
18. GRUNDGESETZ FOR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDGESETZ] [GG]
[BASIC LAw], May 23, 1949, BGB1. I, Art. 19 § 4 (Ger.) (emphasis added).
19. VERWALTUNGSGERICHTSORDNUNG [VwGO] [CODE OF ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
PROCEDURE], Jan. 21, 1960, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil I [BGBL. I] at 17 § 42, in the official
new publication as from March 19, 1991, BGBl. I at 686, last amended by Gesetz [G], Jul.
23, 2013, BGBL. I at 2543, art. 4 (Ger.).
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adoption of an administrative measure ordered in the
event of a refusal or failure to act (action for enjoinder).
(2) Except where otherwise provided by law, such an
action is admissible only if the claimant asserts that his
rights have been impaired by the administrative
measure or by the refusal or failure to act. 20
Section 42(2) of the VwGO needs to be fulfilled for a court to render
an action admissible. Thus, a claimant needs to show that an
"individual public right" possibly has been impaired to be allowed to
raise concerns. This question of admissibility is reflected in the
regulation of an action's merits. The first sentence of Section 113(1) of
the VwGO provides "in so far as the administrative measure is unlawful
and the claimant's rights have thereby been impaired, the court shall set
aside the administrative measure together with any internal appeal
decision where appropriate." 21 According to German public law, then,
only someone whose rights might have been impaired by public
authority is allowed to bring an action (Section 42 VwGO), and this
person will only succeed if the court finds that the claimant's rights
have indeed been impaired (Section 113 VwGO). The regulation has two
consequences: (1) It is not possible to bring action without relying on the
possible impairment of an individual right; and (2) the claimant will not
win her case if the act of public authority was simply unlawful (e.g.,
because it infringed procedural rules that do not protect the claimant);
instead, the act needs to have impaired the claimant's rights.
The requirement to show potential harm for an "individual public
right" led to the development of a peculiar German approach: the
"Schutznormtheorie." To my knowledge, no translation in English exists.
Literally, it translates as "protective norm theory." The classic definition
by its inventor Ottmar Bidhler22 reads as follows:
Individual public right is the legal position of the subject
vis-A-vis the state according to which the subject can
claim something from the state or is entitled to do
something vis-A-vis the state on the basis of a legal
20. Id. (emphasis added) (§ 42 has never been changed since its introduction in 1960).
21. Id. at § 113 (emphasis added).
22. See generally OTTMAR BUHLER, DIE SUBJEKTIVEN OFFENTLICHEN RECHTE UND IHR
SCHUTZ IN DER DEUTSCHEN VERWALTUNGSRECHTSPRECHUNG [INDIVIDUAL PUBLIC RIGHTS
AND THEIR PROTECTION IN GERMAN ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION] (1914) (Ger.).
231
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transaction or a cogent legal provision that is intended
to protect the subject's individual interests. 23
Taking this definition as a starting point, Rainer Wahl, in one of the
leading commentaries on the VwGO, explains the "individual public
right" as follows: "[Bilhler's] definition of the term entails three
prerequisites for an 'individual public right': A cogent legal provision,
conferring legal power, and protecting individual interests." 24 For the
sake of completeness, it should be added that many "individual public
rights" have been "discovered" in norms, which previously were not
considered to entail individual rights that grant access to justice. Thus,
at first look, the seemingly narrow conception of "individual public
rights" has been broadened considerably over time, not lastly by
providing third parties with legal protection ("Drittschutz').25 However,
impairment of an individual's rights is still the starting point for
administrative judicial review.
23. Ottmar Bifhler, Altes und Neues uber Begriff und Bedeutung der subjektiven
dffentlichen Rechte [Old and New About the Concepts and Meaning of Subjective Public
Rights], in FORSCHUNGEN UND BERICHTE AUS DEM OFFENTLICHEN RECHT [RESEARCH AND
REPORTS FROM THE PUBLIC LAW] 269, 274 (Otto Bachof ed., 1955) (Ger.) ("Subjektives
6ffentliches Recht ist diejenige rechtliche Stellung des Untertanen zum Staat, in der er auf
Grund eines Rechtsgeschdfts oder eines zwingenden, zum Schutz seiner Individualinteressen
erlassenen Rechtssatzes, auf den er sich der Verwaltung gegenilber soll berufen kinnen, vom
Staat etwas verlangen kann oder ihm gegendber etwas tun darf.') (quotation translated by
the author here).
24. Rainer Wahl, Vorbemerkung [Preface] § 42 para. 2 of VERWALTUNGSGERICHTS-
ORDNUNG: KOMMENTAR [CODE OF ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE: COMMENTARY] (Friedrich
Schoch, Jens-Peter Schneider & Wolfgang Bier, ed., 2013, originally published 1996) (Ger.)
("Diese Begriffsbestimmung enthdlt zugleich drei Voraussetzungen fir das Vorliegen eines
subjektiven offentlichen Rechts: -zwingender Rechtssatz, -verliehene Rechtsmacht, -
Schutznorm.') (quotation translated by the author here).
25. RAINER WAHL, HERAUSFORDERUNGEN UND ANTWORTEN: DAS OFFENTLICHE RECHT
DER LETZTEN FONF JAHRZEHNTE [CHALLENGES AND ANSWERS: THE PUBLIC LAW OF THE
LAST FIVE DECADES] 34-35 (2006) (Ger.). For classic study, see MATTHIAS SCHMIDT-
PREUSS, KOLLIDIERENDE PRIVATINTERESSEN IM VERWALTUNGSRECHT: DAs SUBJEKTIVE
OFFENTLICHE RECHT IM MULTIPOLAREN VERWALTUNGSRECHTSVERHALTNIS [CONFLICTING
INTERESTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE INDIVIDUAL PUBLIC RIGHT IN MULTI-POLAR
ADMINISTRATIVE LEGAL RELATIONSHIP] (2d ed. 2005) (Ger.) (for a discussion of locus
standi, see 550-625). See also PETER PREU, SUBJEKTIVRECHTLICHE GRUNDLAGEN DES
OFFENTLICHRECHTLICHEN DRITTSCHUTZES [INDIVIDUAL RIGHT BASES OF THE PUBLIC LAW
THIRD PARTY PROTECTION] (1992); PETER PREU, DIE HISTORISCHE GENESE DER
OFFENTLICHRECHTLICHEN BAU- UND GEWERBENACHBARKLAGEN (CA. 1800 - 1970) [THE
HISTORICAL GENESIS OF PUBLIC LAW BUILDING AND BUSINESS NEIGHBORS' COMPLAINTS
(CA. 1800-1970)] (1990) (Ger.).
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C. Representative Action in German Nature-Conservation Law
How, then, does representative environmental action fit into such a
highly individualized concept? Preservation of the environment has
been on the agenda of political activists in Germany since at least the
late 1960s. The political battle was not only about bringing the topic to
public consciousness but also about effective legal protection of the
environment. Thus, environmental law played an important role and
subsequently started to develop as a distinct field of legal research. In
Germany, as in other European countries, the field of environmental
law did not exist up until the late 1960s. 26 Rather, environmental goods
were treated separately: water law, waste law, and emissions law were
regulated independently. 27 In 1986, Article 25 of the Single European
Act transferred the competence to regulate environmental matters to
the European Community (EC). 28 Since then, EC law has set the pace
for new developments in environmental law in Germany and other
Member States. 29 Subsequently, environmental law has been of major
importance for the Europeanization of German law and has often been
experienced as a "provocation" in German legal scholarship.30
Sometimes, the feeling of provocation has even led to resistance against
new "Europeanized" legislation. This was and still is especially true if
the changes affect legal principles considered to be fundamental for
German law.31 One such fundamental principle is the aforementioned
"individual public right." Representative environmental action for NGOs
is perceived to threaten this principle.
In a highly individualized system of administrative judicial review
such as the German one, representative action has always raised
skepticism. Prior to the Aarhus Convention, the only (federal)
regulation on representative action with a real impact was Section 61 of
26. WAHL, supra note 25, 55-56.
27. See MICHAEL KLOEPFER ET AL., ZUR GESCHICHTE DES DEUTSCHEN UMWELTRECHTS
[THE HISTORY OF GERMAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW] (1994) (Ger.).
28. Single European Act, Feb. 17, 1986, 1987 O.J. (L 169) at 1, art. 25.
29. See MICHAEL KLOEPFER, UMWELTSCHUTZRECHT: MIT ENTWURF DES UGB
[ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION LAW: WITH DRAFT OF THE UGB (GERMAN ENVIRONMENTAL
CODE)] 194 (2008) (Ger.).
30. ANNA KATHARINA MANGOLD, GEMEINSCHAFTSRECHT UND DEUTSCHES RECHT: DIE
EUROPAISIERUNG DER DEUTSCHEN RECHTSORDNUNG IN HISTORISCH-EMPIRISCHER SICHT
[COMMUNITY LAW AND GERMAN LAW: THE EUROPEANIZATION OF THE GERMAN LEGAL
SYSTEM IN HISTORICO-EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVE] 236 (2011) (Ger.).
31. Id. at 461-463 (providing examples from environmental law).
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the Law on Nature Protection and Countryside Preservation
(Bundesnaturschutzgesetz, abbreviated as BNatSchG), 32 which states:
(1) Independently of any impairment of its own rights, a .
. . recognised association may bring actions in
accordance with the [VwGO] challenging
1. Exemptions from prohibitions and
requirements intended to protect nature
conservation areas, national parks and other
protected areas. . . and
2. Planning approval decisions concerning
projects which entail an encroachment on nature
and the countryside, together with planning
permits, where public participation is provided
for ...
(2) Actions brought in accordance with subparagraph 1
are not admissible unless the association
1. claims that the adoption of one of the
administrative measures mentioned in the first
sentence of subparagraph 1 contravenes
provisions of the present law, provisions which
have been adopted or which continue to apply on
the basis or within the framework of the present
law, or other provisions which must be taken
into account when adopting an administrative
measure and whose objectives include concern for
nature protection and countryside conservation;
2. is affected as regards a matter which, under
its statutes, is within its ambit and in respect of
which it is recognised . . . .33
32. See Gesetz uiber Naturschutz und Landschaftspflege [Law on Nature Protection
and Countryside Conservation], Bundesnaturschutzgesetz [BNatSchG], Dec. 20, 1976,
BGBL. I at 3574, as amended, § 61 (Ger.).
33. Id., translated in CJEU, Oberverwaltungsgericht [OVG] [Higher Administrative
Court] Mar. 5, 2009, docket number C-115/09 (emphasis added).
234
THE PERSISTENCE OF NATIONAL PECULIARITIES
Even in the very text of the provision, one can detect the strain this
form of representative action presents for traditional administrative
judicial review when comparing paragraph 1 and paragraph 2. While
paragraph 1 allows a recognized association to bring an action
"independently of any impairment of its own rights," paragraph 2
somewhat contradictorily limits the admissibility again and narrows the
right to bring an action strictly to concerns of nature protection that fall
within the association's "ambit" (i.e., its purpose).
D. Judicial Control of the Administration in Germany
As described above,34 Section 113(1) of VwGO states that a claimant
will only win a case if his rights have been impaired. The infringement
of procedural regulations, such as certain due process requirements,
does not suffice to render the act invalid. This approach toward
administrative judicial review is very much concerned with the material
correctness of a solution the administration has chosen, guided by
legislative acts. It is the duty of the administration, as an agent of the
public, to consider "general public interests"; as official authority, it is
believed to fulfill its function even where no individual rights are at
stake. However, no external judicial control will take place in such
cases. In the traditional view, the environment and its protection are
regarded as "general public interest." -Hence, it is difficult to
conceptualize judicial review in environmental matters.
While "individual public rights" lead courts to apply strict scrutiny,
a certain neglect of procedural rules can be observed. Procedural rules
in themselves cannot be used to invalidate an act of public authority. In
this modern legal quarrel, the outcome of the quarrel between von
Gneist, on the one hand, and Bahr and von Sarwey,.on the other hand,
can still be detected: judicial control is not about objective correctness of
a particular solution, but about the impairment of individual rights.
Correspondingly, German public law heavily focuses on substantial
determination of outcomes of administrative decisions through
legislation. 5 Legislation is intended to limit administrative discretion,
so that administrative acts do not impair individual rights.36 To achieve
34. See supra Part I.B.
35. To a large extent, procedural mistakes can be "healed," i.e. the procedural acts can
be made up for later. See, e.g., Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz [VwVfG] [Code of
Administrative Procedure], May 25, 1976, BGBL. I at 1253, § 43 (Ger.).
36. Whether the legislation itself impairs fundamental rights is controlled by the
Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG) (Federal Constitutional Court). Apparently, in its
thoroughness, this binding legislation is also remarkable in a comparative perspective. See
FRIEDERIKE VALERIE LANGE, GRUNDRECHTSBINDUNG DES GESETZGEBERS: EINE
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substantial protection of individual rights and, contrary to common law
conceptions such as the Wednesbury doctrine,37 German administrative
courts are even allowed to consider the administration's exercise of
margin of appreciation (Ermessenskontrolle).38 The German approach of
considering impairment of individual public rights, therefore, is
distinctly different from a procedural approach. A procedural approach
strengthens the right of individuals-and civil society in general-to
participate in processes of administrative decision making. British,
U.S., and EU laws are said to be much more concerned with procedural
rules than with normative determinations of the outcomes of
administrative decisions.39
Maybe not representative, but none-the-less telling, in September
2012, the Public Law Department of the German Jurists' Conference, an
annual meeting of German lawyers, both from practice and academia
and very rich in tradition, rejected the idea of more public participation
in decision making concerning large projects. 40 This vote could be
interpreted as follows: German lawyers41 still want the administration
to deliver decisions determined by substantive legislation and are
clearly opposed to more public participation in administrative decision-
making processes.
German administrative judicial review can be summed up by the
following three concepts: (1) The judiciary repeatedly refers to the
mantra that an actio popularis should be prevented by all means; (2)
representative action has always had an exceptional status in German
public law; and (3) the question of who is allowed to bring action against
the administration is deeply intertwined with the conception of what
administration does: it creates legally sound, correct solutions for
RECHTSVERGLEICHENDE STUDIE zu DEUTSCHLAND, FRANKREICH UND DEN USA [THE
LEGISLATOR'S COMMITMENT TO FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS: A LEGAL-COMPARATIVE STUDY OF
GERMANY, FRANCE, AND THE USA] (2010) (Ger.).
37. Also known as "Wednesbury test of unreasonableness." See Assoc. Provincial
Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corp., [1948] 2 ALL ER 680 (Eng.).
38. See generally TANJA SCHMIDT, DIE SUBJEKTIVIERUNG DES VERWALTUNGSRECHTS
[THE SUBJECTIVATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW] (2006) (providing a detailed historical
analysis of the subjectivation of administrative law).
39. See SABINE SCHLACKE, CBERINDIVIDUELLER RECHTSSCHUTZ: PHANOMENOLOGIE UND
SYSTEMATIK UBERINDIVIDUELLER KLAGEBEFUGNISSE IM VERWALTUNGS- UND
GEMEINSCHAFISRECHT, INSBESONDERE AM BEISPIEL DES UMWELTRECHTs [OVERINDIVIDUAL
LEGAL PROTECTION: PHENOMENOLOGY AND SYSTEMATICS OF OVERINDIVIDUAL COMPLAINT
POWERS IN ADMINISTRATIVE AND COMMUNITY LAW, IN PARTICULAR BY THE EXAMPLE OF
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW] 249-50 (2008) (Ger.).
40. Corinna Sicko, Abteilung Offentliches Recht [Department of Public Law], 68
JURISTENZEITUNG [JZ] 403, 403-04 (2013) (Ger.).
41. That is, those present at the Meeting of the German Jurists' Conference in Munich
in September 2012.
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problems determined by legislative acts or it follows procedural steps,
which eventually will bring about a democratically legitimized solution.
It is in this context that the implementation of representative
environmental action by NGOs takes place. The historical development
is essential to understanding the resistance against forms of
"proceduralization" and possibly also against "democratization" of
administrative decision making in Germany. Against this background,
the resistance against tendencies of the Aarhus Convention and EU law
to "proceduralize" and "democratize" administrative judicial review of
environmental protection is not surprising.
II. TRANSLATING LEGAL REGULATIONS: THE AARHUS CONVENTION AND
EU LAW
In 1992, the United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development met in Rio de Janeiro and adopted the Rio Declaration of
1992, a soft-law instrument that is not binding.42 The Rio Declaration
touched upon the question of representation of environmental concerns.
Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration reads as follows:
Environmental issues are best handled with the
participation of all concerned citizens, at the relevant
level. At the national level, each individual shall have
appropriate access to information concerning the
environment that is held by public authorities, including
information on hazardous materials and activities in
their communities, and the opportunity to participate in
decision-making processes. States shall facilitate and
encourage public awareness and participation by
making information widely available. Effective access to
judicial and administrative proceedings, including
redress and remedy, shall be provided.4 3
42. It is, however, disputed whether at all, and if so which, principles may already be
part of international customary law. Cf. ANDREAS VON ARNAULD, VOLKERRECHT
[INTERNATIONAL LAW] 349 (2012) (Ger.).
43. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro,
Braz., June 3-14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I), Annex I (Aug. 12, 1992) [hereinafter Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development] (emphasis added).
237
INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STuDIES 21:1
In so called Western states, negotiations started under the auspices
of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UN-ECE).44
The UN-ECE Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation
in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters,
known as the Aarhus Convention, was signed on June 25, 1998 in
Aarhus, Denmark. 45 According to Article 20 paragraph 1, the
Convention entered into force on October 30, 2001, after ratification by
sixteen parties, including the European Union and-with some delay-
the Federal Republic of Germany.46 In addition to the two pillars of
access to information and public participation in decision making, the
Aarhus Convention obliges signatory parties in its third pillar to provide
environmental NGOs with access to judicial and extrajudicial
procedures controlling the legality of projects relevant for the
environment (A.). The Aarhus Convention, as an international treaty,
obliges signatory parties to implement its regulations into domestic law.
Such implementation always involves complex acts of legal translation.
Since the European Union is a party to the Aarhus Convention, it has to
implement the Convention into EU law, which then again binds EU
Member States to implement EU law into their domestic law (B.).
44. The UN-ECE is one of five regional commissions of the United Nations and was
founded in 1947 by the UN Economic and Social Committee (ECOSOC) with the aim to
promote economic cooperation among its member states. Member states of the UN-ECE
are the European states as well as the successor states of the Soviet Union, the USA,
Canada, Turkey, Cyprus and Israel. See generally U.N. CoMM'N FOR EUR. (Nov. 28, 2013),
http://www.unece.org/.
45. Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and
Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, June 25, 1998, 2161 U.N.T.S. 447
[hereinafter Aarhus Convention] available at http://www.unece.org/fileadminDAM/env/pp
/documents/cep43e.pdf.
46. Gesetz zu dem Ubereinkommen uber den Zugang zu Informationen, die
Offentlichkeitsbeteiligung an Entscheidungsverfahren und den Zugang zu Gerichten in
Umweltangelegenheiten (Aarhus-U0bereinkommen) [Law on the Convention on Access to
Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in
Environmental Matters (Aarhus Convention)], Dec. 9, 2006, BGBL. II at 1251 (Ger.). For
the Federal Republic of Germany, the Convention entered into force on April 15, 2007; the
instrument of ratification has been deposited with the Secretary General of the United
Nations on January 15, 2007. See Bekanntmachung uber das Inkrafttreten des
Ubereinkommens iber den Zugang zu Informationen, die Offentlichkeitsbeteiligung an
Entscheidungsverfahren und den Zugang zu Gerichten in Umweltangelegenheiten
(Aarhus-Ubereinkommen) [Notice of the Entry into Force of the Aarhus Convention], Aug.
8, 2007, BGBL. II at 1392 (Ger.). See also UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION,
CONVENTION ON ACCESS TO INFORMATION, PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN DECISION-MAKING
AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN ENVIRONMENTAL MATTERS, available at http://treaties.un.org/
doc/Publication/MTDSGIVolume%20II/Chapter%20XXVII/XXVII-13.en.pdf [hereinafter
Aarhus Ratification Record] (listing member state parties to the Aarhus Convention).
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A. The Aarhus Convention: "Democratization" of Environmental
Protection
The Aarhus Convention realizes Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration
from 1992.47 The seventh recital of the Convention states "that every
person has the right to live in an environment adequate to his or her
health and well-being, and the duty, both individually and in
association with others, to protect and improve the environment for the
benefit of present and future generations"; the eighth recital clarifies
"that, to be able to assert this right and observe this duty, citizens must
have access to information, be entitled to participate in decision-making
and have access to justice in environmental matters"; the thirteenth
recital recognizes "the importance of the respective roles that individual
citizens, non-governmental organizations and the private sector can play
in environmental protection"; and, finally, the eighteenth recital
demands "that effective judicial mechanisms should be accessible to the
public, including organizations, so that its legitimate interests are
protected and the law is enforced."48
The "public concerned" is defined rather broadly in Article 2(5),
including environmental NGOs: "the public affected or likely to be
affected by, or having an interest in, the environmental decision-
making; for the purposes of this definition, non-governmental
organizations promoting environmental protection and meeting any
requirements under national law shall be deemed to have an interest."49
Reading the recitals and Article 2(5) of the Aarhus Convention, the
"public" and, more specifically, environmental NGOs play. a key role in
the Convention's concept for protecting the environment. Article 9
regulates access to justice for the "public concerned" in more detail.
Article 9(1) covers access to justice in cases where access to information
has been granted by the Convention. Article 9(2) requires access to
justice for a group of decisions listed in the Convention. It reads as
follows:
Each Party shall, within the framework of its national
legislation, ensure that members of the public concerned
(a) Having a sufficient interest or, alternatively,
47. Aarhus Convention, supra note 45, at 450 (citing Rio Declaration on Environment
and Development, supra note 43, 10).
48. See id. at 450-51 (emphasis added).
49. Id. at 452 (emphasis added).
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(b) Maintaining impairment of a right, where the
administrative procedural law of a Party requires this as
a precondition,
have access to a review procedure before a court of
law and/or another independent and impartial body
established by law, to challenge the substantive and
procedural legality of any decision, act or omission . . . .so
Article 9(3) provides a basic obligation to provide access to justice for
all other decisions relating to the environment in national law.5 '
1. Environmental NGOs as Claimants
What, then, is the legal role of environmental NGOs as claimants?
Article 9(2) introduces two alternatives. Alternative (a) provides access
to judicial review for "members of the public concerned" who have "a
sufficient interest." The meaning of alternative (b) is a bit murkier, and
there have been controversies about its interpretation. 52 Alternative (b)
demands "maintaining impairment of a right" and needs to be read
together with the half-sentence "where the administrative procedural
law of a Party requires this [i.e. the impairment of a right] as a
precondition." Alternatives (a) and (b) of Article 9(2) can be
implemented "alternatively" by the parties to the Convention. The
alternatives accommodate two different approaches to administrative
judicial review in countries that have ratified the Aarhus Convention:
the first approach is based on "sufficient interest" (alternative (a)); the
second approach demands "impairment of a right" (alternative (b)). As
shown above,53 Germany requires "impairment of a right" (namely, an
"individual public right") as a precondition to administrative judicial
review. The Aarhus Convention places the two alternatives at the
disposal of the parties-which system they choose is up to them.
Providing parties with a choice is an attempt to facilitate
translating regulatory aims into domestic law. Yet, at the same time,
50. Aarhus Convention, supra note 45, art. 9(2) (emphasis added).
51. Article 9, § 3 provides that "In addition . . . , members of the public have access to
administrative or judicial procedures to challenge acts and omissions by private persons
and public authorities which contravene provisions of its national law relating to the
environment." Id. at 460 (Emphasis added). Article 9, § 4 of the Aarhus Convention further
provides that the environmental review procedures provided in §§ 2-3 shall be "fair,
equitable, timely and not prohibitively expensive." Id.
52. See SCHLACKE, supra note 39, at 248-49.
53. See supra Part I.
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choice sustains ambiguity. The telos of the Aarhus Convention, as
expressed both in the recitals and in Article 9, arguably is to provide
"wide access to justice" for the "public concerned" and for environmental
NGOs as part of this public. Such a view highlights the "advocatoric
function of representative action."54
The very first ruling of the Aarhus Compliance Committee
regarding alternatives (a) and (b) of Article 9(2) supports this view.55
The Compliance Committee held that "[a]lthough what constitutes a
sufficient interest and impairment of a right shall be determined in
accordance with national law, it must be decided 'with the objective of
giving the public concerned wide access to justice' within the scope of the
Convention" and states that national law cannot be used "as an excuse
for introducing or maintaining so strict criteria that they effectively bar
all or almost all environmental organizations from challenging act [sic]
or omissions that contravene national law relating to the
environment."56
Apparently, the negotiating parties also considered "wide access to
justice" as a central demand imposed by the Aarhus Convention. From
the very beginning, one of the most controversial topics was the
introduction of representative environmental action, both in the treaty
negotiations and in German legal scholarship.5 7 In the treaty
54. See Andreas Fischer-Lescano, Transnationales Verwaltungsrecht: Privatverwaltungsrecht,
Verbandsklage und Kollisionsrecht nach der Arhus-Konvention /Transnational Administrative
Law: Private Administrative Law, Collective Action, and Conflicts of Law After the Aarhus-
Convention], 63 JURISTENZEITUNG [JZ] 373, 375 (2008) (Ger.).
55. The Aarhus Compliance Committee will be considered further infra Part III.B.1.
56. See Report of the Meeting of the Parties to the Convention on Access to Info., Pub.
Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Envtl. Matters, U.N. ESCOR,
June 14-16, 2006, 27-35, U.N. DOC. ECE/MP.PP/C.1/2006/4/Add.2 (July 28, 2006)
(emphasis added).
57. For relevant treaty negotiations, see ANGELA SCHWERDTFEGER, DER DEUTSCHE
VERWALTUNGSRECHTSSCHUTZ UNTER DEM EINFLUSS DER AARHUS-KONVENTION: ZUGLEICH
EIN BEITRAG ZUR FORTENTWICKLUNG DER SUBJEKTIVEN OFFENTLICHEN RECHTE UNTER
BESONDERER BERICKSICHTIGUNG DES GEMEINSCHAFTSRECHTS [GERMAN ADMINISTRATIVE
JUDICIAL REVIEW UNDER INFLUENCE OF THE AARHUS-CONVENTION: A CONTRIBUTION TO
DEVELOP INDIVIDUAL PUBLIC RIGHTS WITH PARTICULAR REGARD TO COMMUNITY LAW], 291
(2010) (Ger.). For relevant German legal scholarship, see Martin Kment, Der ewige
Patient: die Umweltverbandsklage-Einblicke in eine lange Krankenakte und neue
Therapieansatze [The Everlasting Patent: Environmental Collective Action-Insights in a
Voluminous Patient Document and New Therapies], 2013 UMWELT- UND PLANUNGSRECHT
41, 41-47 (providing a summary of representative environmental action with reference to
fierce controversies on the subject in footnotes 35-36) (Ger.); Christian Walter,
Internationalisierung des deutschen und Europiischen Verwaltungsverfahrens- und
Verwaltungsprozessrechts - am Beispiel der Arhus-Konvention [Internationalization of
German and European Administrative Proceedings and Administrative Court Procedural
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negotiations, Germany worked toward a dilution of access to justice,
especially of the provision in Article 9. Eventually, Germany achieved
the incorporation of alternative (b) in Article 9(2).58 Still, the Aarhus
Convention was considered to demand changes too fundamental,
especially for the German system of administrative judicial review.
Germany did not sign the Convention until the last possible day, and
only after a change of government and after a new Minister of the
Environment, a member of the Green Party, took office.59 In the end,
Germany ratified the Convention on January 15, 2007 and became its
fortieth party.60
2. "Democratization" of Environmental Protection
The Aarhus Convention internationalizes administrative procedural
law and locus standi.61 It also allows transboundary claimants to bring
action.62 As Andreas Fischer-Lescano rightly states:
The Aarhus Convention is procedural and transnational.
Modern "environmental protection through procedure"
includes numerous actors, also non-state actors, within
and outside of state-administrative centres of decision-
making; it transcends the classic ius inter gentes both in
a spatial and in a functional regard.63
Former Secretary General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan,
characterized the Aarhus Convention as follows: "Although regional in
scope, the significance of the Aarhus Convention is global .... [Ilt is the
Law-By the Example of the Aarhus Convention], 2005 EUROPARECHT [EUR. L.] 302, 306 &
n.24 (Ger.).
58. See SCHWERDTFEGER, supra note57, at 16.
59. See Thomas Bunge, Einleitung [Introduction], in INFORMATIONSRECHTE,
OFFENTICHKEITSBETELIGUNG UND RECHTSSCHUTZ IM UMWELTRECHT' AARHUS-HANDBUCH
[INFORMAnON RIGHTS, PUBLIc PARTICIPAION AND LEGAL PROPEcTON IN ENVIRONMENTAL IAW:
AARHUS-HANDBOOK] 1, 8 (Sabine Schlacke, Christian Schrader & Thomas Bunge eds., 2010);
NicolA WIESINGER, INNOVATON IM VERWALTUNGSRECHT DURCH INTERNATIONALSIERUNG: EINE
RECHTSVERGLEICHENDE STUDIE AM BEISPIEL DER AARHUS-KONVENTION [INNOVATION IN
ADMINIsarlnVE LAW THROUGH INTERNATIONALISATION: A COMPARATIVE STUDY USING THE
EXAMPLE OF THE AARHUS CONVENTION] 36 (2013) (Ger.).
60. See Aarhus Ratification Record, supra note 46.
61. Hans-Joachim Koch & Christin 1Vielke, Globalisierung des Umweltrechts
[Globalization of Environmental Law], 2009 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR UMWELTRECHT [J. ENVTL.
L.] [ZUR] 403, 405 (Ger.).
62. See Alan Boyle, Human Rights and the Environment: Where Next?, 23 EuR. J. INT'L
L. 613, 635 (2012).
63. See Fischer-Lescano, supra note 54, at 374.
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most ambitious venture in the area of 'environmental democracy' so far
undertaken under the auspices of the United Nations."64
-The Aarhus Convention does not focus on a -specific global
environmental problem, such as climate change, pollution of the seas, or
protection of endangered species. Rather, it aims to generally
strengthen the position of the public in regards to environmental
protection, namely by providing actors with rights to information, rights
to participation in environmentally relevant administrative procedures,
and finally with access to justice.65 The "public concerned" is allowed
and, to some extent, encouraged to participate both individually and as
collective organizations. Even though the "public concerned" does not
legislate upon environmental decisions, broader public participation
arguably leads to more democratic legitimacy of such decisions. Hence,
to enable public participation in processes of environmental decision
making can rightly be labeled as "democratization" of environmental
law. 66
Going one step further, Alan Boyle makes an interesting point in
arguing that access to justice as outlined in the Aarhus Convention
should lead to an interpretation of the Convention as a human rights
treaty because "[p]ublic participation is a central element in sustainable
development" and participatory rights "can be seen as a means of
legitimizing decisions about sustainable development."67 He calls the
procedural rights of the Aarhus Convention "the most important
environmental addition to human rights law since the 1992 Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development."68
3. Translating an International Treaty
When translating between legal spheres, the process of translation
does not only entail translations in a metaphorical sense but also
translations in a literal, hands-on sense. Authentic texts of the Aarhus
Convention exist in English, French, and Russian as official languages
of the UN-ECE. The United Nations has officially translated the text of
the Convention into Arabic, Chinese, and Spanish. Unofficial
64. STEPHEN STEC & SUSAN CASEY-LEFKOWITZ, U.N. EcoN. COMM'N FOR EuR., THE
AARHUS CONVENTION: AN IMPLEMENTATION GUIDE, at v, U.N. Doc. ECE/CEP/72, U.N.
Sales No. E.00.II.E.3 (Jerzy Jendroska ed., 2000) [hereinafter AARHUS IMPLEMENTATION
GUIDE], http:// www.unece.org/env/pp/acig.pdf (emphasis added).
65. See Koch & Mielke, supra note 61, at 405.
66. See Jeremy Wates, The Aarhus Convention: A Driving Force for Environmental
Democracy, 2 J. EUR. ENVTL. & PLAN. L. 2, 5-6 (2005).
67. See Boyle, supra note 62, at 622.
68. See id. at 616.
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translations in a variety of other languages exist as well: Armenian,
Bosnian, Bulgarian, Czech, Danish, Estonian, Finnish, Georgian,
German, Greek, Hungarian, Italian, Japanese, Kazakh, Latvian,
Lithuanian, Macedonian, Mongolian, Polish, Portuguese, Romanian,
Slovak, Slovenian, Swedish, and Ukrainian. 69
This impressive list shows the importance of literal translations of
legal documents in the international realm. Translations become points
of dispute if their meanings differ. An assumption of this paper is that
disputes over correct translations inevitably will occur precisely because
translations are not only about literal transference of meaning but also
about the connotations and connections every single word entails. The
framework in which legal translations happen is the entire legal order,
including its history and peculiarities.
B. European Union Law: "Proceduralization" of Environmental
Protection
The European Union is party to the Aarhus Convention and,
therefore, is under an obligation to implement its provisions into EU
law. The European Union was an important initiator of the Aarhus
Convention; to a considerable extent, the Convention's regulations
mirror preexisting EU law, 70 and it is, therefore, not very surprising
that subsequent EU legislation also mirrors the Aarhus Convention.
This is especially true for access to information and participation in
decision making. The regulation of the procedural and judicial law of
the Member States, though, does not easily fit into the catalogue of
enumerated competencies of the European Union.71 As the Aarhus
Convention touches upon competencies of both the European Union and
its Member States, it is a so called mixed agreement. 72 Regarding access
to justice, the competence of the European Union to regulate on the
matter is hotly debated: 73 traditionally, Member States of the European
Union are organizationally autonomous (i.e., they have to implement
EU law into their domestic law), but how they achieve enforcement of
EU law and how they organize the execution of EU law is up to the
69. For unofficial translations of the Aarhus Convention in other languages see U.N.
Econ. Comm'n for Eur., Full Text of the Convention, http://www.unece.org/env/pp/treatytex
t.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2013).
70. See SCHLACKE, supra note 39, at 249.
71. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, art. 5, Sept. 5, 2008,
2008 O.J. (C 115) 13, 18 [hereinafter TEU] ('The limits of Union competences are
governed by the principle of conferral. The use of Union competences is governed by the
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.").
72. For further references, see SCHLACKE, supra note 39, at 250.
73. See id.
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Member States. The idea of "indirect enforcement" of EU law tries to
capture this supposedly clear-cut distinction; in reality, though, the
distinction became blurred a long time ago. 7
1. Translating the Aarhus Convention into European Union Law
In the case of the Aarhus Convention, the European Union has, so
far, implemented Article 9(2) in Directive 2003/35,75 but Article 9(3) has
not yet been implemented despite a proposal of the Commission since
2004.76 Directive 2003/35 amended the Environmental Impact
Assessment (EIA) Directive.77 Recitals 3 and 4 in the preamble to
Directive 2003/35 concern public participation.78 Recital 4 refers
expressly to the role of environmental NGOs, stating that "participation
by associations, organisations and groups, in particular
nongovernmental organisations promoting environmental protection,
should . .. be fostered."79
Article 1(2) of the EIA Directive,80 as amended by Directive 2003/35,
virtually mirrors Article 2(5) of the Aarhus Convention in defining "the
public concerned."81 Directive 2003/35 also inserted a new article--
74. See MANGOLD, supra note 30, at 374-76.
75. Council Directive 03/35, Providing for Public Participation in Respect of the
Drawing Up of Certain Plans and Programmes Relating to the Environment and
Amending with Regard to Public Participation and Access to Justice Council Directives
85/337/EEC and 96/61/EC, 2003 O.J. (L 156) 17, 17 (EC) [hereinafter Directive 2003/35]
(citing Council Directive 85/337/EEC, on the Assessment of the Effects of Certain Public
and Private Projects on the Environment, 1985 O.J. (L 175) 40 [hereinafter Directive
85/337/EEC]; Council Directive 96/61/EC, Concerning Integrated Pollution Prevention and
Control, 1996 O.J. (L 257) 26 [hereinafter Directive 96/61/EC]) (implementing art. 9, § 2 of
the Aarhus Convention, supra note 47, at 459-60).
76. See generally Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the
Council on Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, COM (2003) 624 final (Oct. 24,
2003).
77. See Directive 2003/35, supra note 75, at 18-20 (amending the EIA Directive
(originally Directive 85/337/EEC, supra note 75)).
78. See id. at 17, Recital 3 (Effective public participation in the taking of decisions
enables the public to express, and the decision-maker to take account of, opinions and
concerns which may be relevant to those decisions, thereby increasing the accountability
and transparency of the decision-making process and contributing to public awareness of
environmental issues and support for the decisions taken." (emphasis added)).
79. See id. at 17 (emphasis added).
80. For the important role of Environmental Impact Assessment in the process of
Europeanisation of German public law, see Mangold, supra note 30, at 236-7.
81. Compare Directive 2003/35, supra note 75, at 19 ("the public affected or likely to be
affected by, or having an interest in, the environmental decision-making procedures
referred to in Article 2(2); for the purposes of this definition, non-governmental
organisations promoting environmental protection and meeting any requirements under
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Article 10(a)-into the EIA Directive. Article 10(a) of the EIA Directive
contains provisions dealing with access to justice and follows the Aarhus
Convention in offering Member States a choice between alternative (a)
"sufficient interest" and alternative (b) "impairment of a right."82 Article
10(a)(3) is noteworthy because it expressly demands an interpretation
with a view to granting "wide access to justice":
(3) What constitutes a sufficient interest and
impairment of a right shall be determined by the
Member States, consistently with the objective of giving
the public concerned wide access to justice. To this end,
the interest of any non-governmental organisation
meeting the requirements referred to in Article 1(2),
shall be deemed sufficient for the purpose of
subparagraph (a) of this Article. Such organisations
shall also be deemed to have rights capable of being
impaired for the purpose of subparagraph (b) of this
Article.83
These provisions fit neatly into EU environmental law, which has
been characterized by developments toward "proceduralization" since
the mid-1980s.84 Generally, the EU regulation implementing the Aarhus
Convention stresses the importance of "wide access to justice,"85 while,
at the same time, trying to accommodate the two most important
national law shall be deemed to have an interest" (emphasis added)), with Aarhus
Convention, supra note 43, art. 2(5), at 452.
82. Directive 2003/35, supra note 75, at 20 (amending Directive 85/337/EEC, supra
note 75) ("[1] Member States shall ensure that, in accordance with the relevant national
legal system, members of the public concerned: (a) having a sufficient interest, or
alternatively, (b) maintaining the impairment of a right, where administrative procedural
law of a Member State requires this as a precondition, have access to a review procedure
before a court of law or another independent and impartial body established by law to
challenge the substantive or procedural legality of decisions, acts or omissions subject to
the public participation provisions of this Directive. [2] Member States shall determine at
what stage the decisions, acts or omissions may be challenged." (emphasis added)).
83. See id. at 20. (emphasis added).
84. See SCHLACKE, supra note 39, at 413-414; Matthias Schmidt-Preuf3, Gegenwart
und Zukunft des Verfahrensrechts [Present and Future of Procedural Law], 2005 NEUE
ZEITSCHRIFr FOR VERWALTUNGSRECHT [NEW REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATiVE LAw] [NVwZ]
489, 492 (Ger.).
85. It is, however, criticized that the EU has not legislated in a coherent body of
regulations but in a fragmented way. See generally Charles Poncelet, Access to Justice in
Environmental Matters-Does the European Union Comply with Its Obligations? 24 J.
ENvTL. L. 287 (2012) (questioning the effectiveness of judicial remedies concerning
environmental measures taken by EU authorities).
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approaches to administrative judicial review among Member States of
the European Union: the "sufficient interest" approach and the
"impairment of a right" approach.
2. Literal Translations in EU Law
The European Union now has twenty-seven Member States, many
of which have more than one official language. Therefore, it is not
surprising that the multilingualism of the European Union has been
discussed in academia.86 The European Commission has even issued a
little brochure on "Translation and Multilingualism."87
Different language versions often result in controversies in EU
law.8 8 The difficulties are even more profound in EU law than in
international law. Article 55 of the Treaties of the European Union
(TEU) acknowledges twenty-three official languages, each of which is
legally recognized as equally authentic.89 Because the working
languages in European institutions are mainly English, French, and
German, translations of legal texts occur on a daily basis.
86. See generally THOMAS BRUHA, DIE EUROPAiSCHE UNION UND IHRE SPRACHEN:
INTERDISZIPLINARES SYMPosIUM zUR VIELSPRACHIGKEIT ALS HERAUSFORDERUNG UND
PROBLEMNATIK DES EUROPAISCHEN EINIGUNGSPROZESSES: GESPRACH ZWISCHEN
WISSENSCHAFT UND PRAXIS [THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS LANGUAGES: AN
INTERDISCIPLINARY SYMposIuM ABOUT MULTILINGUALITY AS A CHALLENGE AND PROBLEM
OF THE PROCESS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: DIALOGUE BETWEEN ACADEMIA AND
PRACTICE] (1998) (Ger.); ISABEL SCHBEL-PFISTER, SPRACHE UND GEMEINSCHAFTSRECHT
[LANGUAGE AND COMMUNITY LAW] (2004) (Ger.). See also Karin Luttermann,
Mehrsprachigkeit am Europiischen Gerichtshof Dos Referenzsprachenmodell fiir ein EU-
Sprachenrecht [Multilinguality at the European Court of Justice: The Reference Language
Model for an EU-Language Law], in STUDIEN ZUR RECHTSKOMMUNIKATION [STUDIES ON
LEGAL COMMUNICATION] 47 (Dorothee Heller & Konrad Ehlich eds., 2007) (Ger.), for a
discussion from a linguistic perspective.
87. See generally EUR. COMM'N, TRANSLATION AND MULTILINGUALISM (2012).
88. This is seen most prominently in the recent debate about the interpretation of
Article 51 of the EU's Charter of Fundamental Rights because the German and English
version indicate a more limited scope of the Charter than other versions. See Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 51, Dec, 18. 2000, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1, 21.
89. See TEU, supra note 71, art. 55, at 45 ("This Treaty, drawn up in a single original
in the Bulgarian, Czech, Danish, Dutch, English, Estonian, Finnish, French, German,
Greek, Hungarian, Irish, Italian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Maltese, Polish, Portuguese,
Romanian, Slovak, Slovenian, Spanish and Swedish languages, the texts in each of these
languages being equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of
the Italian Republic, which will transmit a certified copy to each of the governments of the
other signatory States." (emphasis added)).
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III. ATTEMPTING A TRANSLATION INTO GERMAN LAW:
"INDIVIDUALIZATION" OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
Nation-states that are both a party to the Aarhus Convention and a
Member State of the European Union, such as Germany, are under a
dual obligation to implement both the Aarhus Convention and the
corresponding EU law into their domestic law. In this article, Germany
and its implementation of access to justice for environmental NGOs
serve as a multidimensional and multifaceted example of a legal
translation.
Germany made a first attempt at a translation of the Aarhus
Convention (and subsequent EU law) in 2006. Legal translation,
though, takes place in complex fields of hierarchy and is controlled.
After the CJEU in 2011 condemned Germany for too narrowly
translating the Aarhus/EU conception of representative environmental
action, in April 2013 a second attempt was issued-its success is yet to
be determined.
A. The First Translation of the Aarhus Convention
After the Aarhus Convention and subsequent Directive 2003/35/EC,
German legal scholars disagreed on the necessity of major changes in
preexisting German law: while some pointed to indispensable changes,9o
others could not detect any such necessity to adapt.91 Such disparate
assessments result from alternatives (a) and (b) from the Aarhus
Convention and EU law, which were left at the disposal of
parties/Member States. As is clear from what has been reported so far,
implementation in Germany has to be considered in the framework of
alternative (b), as German administrative judicial review requires
"impairment of an individual public right."
In 2006, the Environmental Appeals Act (Umweltrechtsbehelfsgesetz,
abbreviated as UmwRG) implemented Directive 2003/35/EC into German
law. Section 2(1) of the UmwRG, in particular, provides:
A domestic or foreign association recognised under
[specified conditions] may bring an action in accordance
90. See, e.g., Felix Ekhardt, Die nationale Klagebefugnis nach der Aarhus-Konvention
[The National Locus Standi After the Aarhus Convention], 2006 NVwZ 55 (Ger.); Felix
Ekardt & Katharina Pohlmann, Europaische Klagebefugnis: Offentlichkeitsrichtlinie,
Klagerechtsrichtlinie und ihre Folgen [European Standing: Directive on Public
Accessibility, Directive on Standing and Their Consequences], 2005 NVwZ 532 (Ger.).
91. See Schmidt-Preu83, supra note 84, at 494 ("acknowledgement of the German
approach of individual protection" (quotation translated by the author here)).
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with the VwGO to challenge a decision within the
meaning of the first sentence of Paragraph 1(1) or a
failure to adopt such a decision, without being required
to maintain an impairment of its own rights, provided
that the association
1. asserts that a decision within the meaning of the first
sentence of paragraph 1(1) or a failure to adopt such a
decision contravenes legislative provisions which seek to
protect the environment, which confer individual rights
and which may be relevant to the decision. 92
However, Section 2(5) of UmwRG states that:
Actions brought in accordance with subparagraph 1
shall be deemed well founded,
1. in so far as the decision within the meaning of the
first sentence of Paragraph 1(1) or the failure to adopt
such a decision infringes legislative provisions which
seek to protect the environment, which confer individual
rights and which are relevant to the decision and the
infringement affects environmental protection concerns
included in the objectives which the association, under
its statutes, is committed to promote.9 3
Certainly, a "trans-individual dimension" of representative
environmental action can be discerned in these provisions, and
environmental protection associations may be considered "advocates for
the environment," as Andreas Fischer-Lescano formulated in his
argumentative statement in favor of a broad reading of these
92. Gesetz iuber ergAnzende Vorschriften zu Rechtsbehelfen in Umweltangelegenheiten
nach der EG-Richtlininie 2003/35/EG [Law on Supplementary Rules to Appeals in
Environmental Matters According to the EC Directive 2003/35/EG], Umwelt-
Rechtsbehelfsgesetz [JmwRG] [Environmental Appeals Act], Dec. 7, 2006, BGBL. I at
2816, § 2(1) (Ger.). "The present law shall apply to actions which challenge . . . decisions
within the meaning of section 2 paragraph 3 of the Gesetz iber die
Umweltvertraglichkeitspriifung (UVPG) (Law on environmental impact assessments)
concerning the admissibility of projects in relation to which under . . . the UVPG . . . there
may be an obligation to implement an environmental impact assessment." Id. at 2816, §
1(1) (quotation translated by the author here).
93. Id. at § 2(5).
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provisions. 94 In the end, however, the German translation of the Aarhus
Convention and EU regulations remains very ambiguous. On the one
hand, environmental associations are not required to "maintain an
impairment of their own right," while, on the other hand, such actions
will only be successful if provisions that protect individual rights are
infringed."
As shown above, both the Aarhus Convention and subsequent EU
law demand "wide access to justice."96 Notably, at the time the UmwRG
was issued, its conformity with both regulations had been highly
questionable.9 7 However, it is a specific feature of legal translations that
they are controlled-mostly within judicial hierarchies; in the end,
courts decide whether or not a legal translation is appropriate.
B. Translating in Hierarchies: Duties to Translate and Control Issues
With international and supranational (European) law, different
levels of legislation are involved in regulating representative
environmental. action.98 Every level has its own bodies to control
effective implementation of its legislation. Translations, then, do not
occur free from any form of "hierarchy": compliance mechanisms and
judicial review of enforcement measures have to be considered when
describing legal translations. Germany is under dual control; both the
Aarhus Compliance Committee and the CJEU monitor Germany's
translation of representative environmental action into German law.
94. See Fischer-Lescano, supra note 54, at 378 (mentioning "transsubjektiv" (trans-
individual) and signifying a dimension beyond the traditional public individual right
approach).
95. See Sabine Schlacke, Die Novelle des Umwelt-Rechtsbehelfsgesetzes: EuGH ante
portas? [Amendment to the Environmental Appeals Act: CJEU ante portas?], 2013
ZEITScHRIFr FOR UMWELTRECHT [ZUR] 195 (Ger.) (explaining that an association is only
allowed to contest infringements of objectives that are listed in the statute and that until
the middle of 2012, forty-two lawsuits based on § 2 of the UmwRG had been decided by
German courts, with fourteen proceedings pending before courts at the time).
96. See discussion supra Parts II.A.1 (Aarhus Convention), II.B.1 (EU Law).
97. See Felix Ekardt, Das UmWveltrechtsbehelfsgesetz vor dem EuGH und dem BVerwG
[The Environmental Appeals Act Before the Court of Justice and the Federal
Administrative Court], 2012 NVwZ 530, 530 n.2 (Ger.).
98. The term "level," as in multi-level governance, in part is misleading as it suggests a
clear and distinct separation of these levels where in fact the boundaries are sometimes
clear and sometimes blurred, and not always simply horizontal. Sabino Cassese
introduced the term "marble cake" as a better description at a conference in Heidelberg in
2008. "Marble cake" is both more to the point and funnier. Regrettably, it could not win
much ground compared to "levels." Thus, the term "level" will be used with the caveat in
mind.
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These mechanisms, however, are not strictly hierarchical but rather
should be seen in their respective and very complex contexts.
1. Aarhus and Its Control: The Compliance Commission
In Article 15, the Aarhus Convention foresees a compliance
mechanism to be established by the Meeting of the Parties.99 In its
decision 1/7 on review of compliance, the Meeting of the Parties
regulated the structure and functions of a Compliance Committee and,
surprisingly for an international law body, decided that
"communications may be brought before the Committee by one or more
members of the public concerning that Party's compliance with the
Convention."100 Hence, the Committee hears complaints from the public
or civil society organizations that are interested,101 which provides
nonstate actors with access to review procedures before an international
body.102 Currently pending before the Aarhus Convention Compliance
Committee is a complaint by Friends of the Earth Germany (Bund fiir
Umwelt-und Naturschutz Deutschland), one of the most established
environmental NGOs in Germany. The complaint attacks the
translation of the Aarhus Convention into German law. 03 The
proceedings were stayed until the Trianel ruling of the CJEU,104 and
were resumed after the CJEU's judgment. Currently, the Committee is
considering the most recent amendments to the UmwRG, and issued its
99. Aarhus Convention, supra note 45, at 463 ("The Meeting of the Parties shall
establish, on a consensus basis, optional arrangements of a non-confrontational, non-
judicial and consultative nature for reviewing compliance with the provisions of this
Convention. These arrangements shall allow for appropriate public involvement and may
include the option of considering communications from members of the public on matters
related to this Convention.").
100. See Report of the First Meeting of the Parties Decision I/7: Review of Compliance 4,
U.N. ESCOR, Oct. 21-23, 2002, U.N. Doc. ECE/MP.PP/2/Add.8 (Apr. 2, 2004) (emphasis
added), available at http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/pp/documents/mopl/ece.mp.
pp.2.add.8.e.pdf.
101. The Aarhus Convention's Compliance Committee Receives 50th Communication,
U.N. EcoN. COMM'N FOR EUR., http://www.inece.org/press/pr20l0/lOenvpl9e.htm (last
visited Dec. 2, 2013) (explaining that the Compliance Committee reviews cases of alleged
non-compliance by a Party to the Aarhus Convention).
102. See Veit Koester, Review of Compliance Under the Aarhus Convention: A Rather
Unique Compliance Mechanism, 2 J. EUR. ENVTL. & PLAN. L. 31 (2005).
103. ClientEarth Complaint, supra note 5.
104. See Case C-115/09, Bund fir Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland,
Landesverband Nordrhein-Westfalen eV v. Bezirksregierung Arnsberg, 2011 E.C.R. I-
3676 $ 28 [hereinafter Opinion of A.G. Sharpston], available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/
LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62009CC01 15:EN:PDF.
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draft findings on November 11, 2013.105 The Committee intends to find
that German law does not comply with Article 9(3) of the Aarhus
Conventions because the impairment of rights doctrine is still applied to
environmental NGOs in all areas other than the UmwRG and the
BNatSchG. The Committee broadly states, "access to [justice] should be
the presumption, not the exception."106 The German government's
response relies on possible interpretive extension of the "impairment of
rights doctrine" by German courts.107 It is highly doubtable that the
Committee would follow this argument. The Committee will very likely
find against Germany.
Looking at the scenery even more closely, the picture is much more
complex and nuanced than issues of "hierarchies" and "control" suggest.
As mentioned above, Germany was an important and influential
negotiator in drafting the Aarhus Convention and successfully
introduced alternative (b), the "impairment of a right" approach, into
the text. 08 Therefore, it is plausible that Germany invokes, at least to
some extent, leeway in translating the Convention. Since the Aarhus
Convention provides parties with a choice to facilitate implementation
into respective domestic law, the idea of such leeway is certainly not out
of the question. Rather, the legislative approach to providing such a
choice (on Germany's insistence) probably needs clarification.
Presumably, only a Meeting of the Parties offers political opportunity to
reach a mutual agreement, which is what the Compliance Committee in
its draft findings suggests.1 09
Interestingly, the German legal texts need to be translated into
English, the working language of the Aarhus Compliance Committee." 0
Communications should be submitted in one of the UN-ECE languages
(English, Russian, and French); communications in Russian or French
will be translated into English.' Supporting documentation is
translated as well, unless it is very burdensome, in which case an
English summary is prepared by a committee member familiar with the
105. The Draft Findings provide an interesting albeit rather simplified narrative of the
"impairment of rights doctrine." See ClientEarth Complaint, supra note 5, 1 27-35, 37.
106. See ClientEarth Complaint, supra note 5, Draft Findings (Nov. 11, 2013), 92, 97,
98.
107. See ClientEarth Complaint, supra note 5, Comments on the Draft Findings (by
Germany, Nov. 12, 2013), at 7-11.
108. See supra Part II.A.1.
109. See ClientEarth Complaint, supra note 5, Draft Findings (Nov. 11, 2013), 1 101.
110. See U.N. ECON. COMM'N FOR EuR., GUIDANCE DOCUMENT ON THE AARHUS
CONVENTION COMPLIANCE MECHANISM 13 (2010), available at http://www.unece.org/filead
min/DAM/env/pp/compliance/CCGuidanceDocument.pdf.
111. See id. at 35.
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specific language.112 Finally, measures or recommendations are
translated by the Bureau of the Aarhus Convention into the three
official UN-ECE languages.11 3 Translations from the original languages
are meant to address the complex embeddedness of the relevant law,
both within the broader legal framework and the politico-historical
context of the law.114
2. EU Law and Its Control: The Court of Justice of the European
Union
In many environmental agreements, the European Union has
proven an effective, even decisive, actor in the implementation of
international treaties into domestic law; the European Union can be
described as a self-declared "assistant in executing" international
environmental law.115 Another leading actor in this process is the CJEU.
It has already delivered three important decisions regarding the Aarhus
Convention and its implementation into the domestic laws of EU
Member States, one concerning Sweden (Djairgardenle6 ), the second
concerning the Czech Republic (Slovak Bears'1T), and the third
concerning Germany (Trianel"8). It is an interesting feature of EU law
that judgments of the CJEU have implications for all Member States,
even those who did not participate in a specific case. The findings of
these three decisions clarify what the CJEU wants Member States to
achieve when implementing the Aarhus Convention and corresponding
EU law.
In Djirgarden, the CJEU held, firstly, that prior participation of
NGOs in the administrative process of decision making could not justify
their exclusion from access to review procedures." 9 Secondly, it held
112. See id. at 36.
113. See id. at 21.
114. The draft findings of the Compliance Committee reveal how complex the German
legal situation appears to be from a bystander's perspective, see ClientEarth Complaint,
supra note 5, Draft Findings (Nov. 11, 2013), 1 24-38.
115. See Koch & Mielke, supra note 61, at 407 ("selbstengagierte 'Vollzugshelferin' im
Umweltv6lkerrecht").
116. Case C-263/08, DjurgArden-Lilla Vdrtans Miljoskyddsf6rening v. Stockholms
kommun genom dess marknamnd, 2009 E.C.R. 1-9967 [hereinafter Djargarden].
117. Case C-240/09, Lesoochrandrske zoskupenie VLK v. Ministerstvo iivotn6ho
prostredia Slovenskej republiky, 2011 E.C.R. 1-1255 [hereinafter Slovak Bears].
118. See Case C-115/09, Bund fr Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland,
Landesverband Nordrhein-Westfalen eV v. Bezirksregierung Arnsberg, 2011 E.C.R. I-
3701 [hereinafter Trianel].
119. See Djirgarden, supra note 116, T 39.
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that environmental protections associations did not need to have at
least two thousand members.
In Slovak Bears, a case concerning Article 9(3) of the Aarhus
Convention, the CJEU attributed itself the power not only to interpret
EU law but also the Aarhus Convention and to give a ruling on whether
or not the Convention has direct effect within Member States' laws. 120
The Court held that it did have effect because Brown Bears were a
species protected by the EU Habitats directive, 121 even though
Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention had not yet been explicitly
implemented into -EU law. 122 While Article 9(3) of the Aarhus
Convention "[does] not contain any clear and precise obligation capable
of directly regulating the legal position of individuals,"123 nevertheless,
"it must be observed that those provisions, although drafted in broad
terms, are intended to ensure effective environmental protection."1 24
Relying on the principle of effectiveness (effet utile), the CJEU held that
"if the effective protection of EU environmental law is not to be
undermined, it is inconceivable that Article 9(3) of the Aarhus
Convention be interpreted in such a way as to make it in practice
impossible or excessively difficult to exercise rights conferred by EU
law."125 Concluding, the CJEU stated that "it is for the national court, in
order to ensure effective judicial protection in the fields covered by EU
environmentallaw, to interpret its national law in a way which, to the
fullest extent possible, is.consistent with the objectives laid down in
Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention."126
Finally, in May 2011, the CJEU, in its Trianel decision, ruled on
Germany's regulation of actions by environmental protection
organizations. Coincidentally, the case involved a preliminarily referred
case concerning the same environmental NGO, Friends of the Earth
Germany, which brought the complaint to the Aarhus Compliance
Committee. In its ruling, the CJEU simply and clearly stated:
If . . . those organisations must be able to rely on the
same rights as individuals, it would be contrary to the
objective of giving the public concerned wide access to
justice and at odds with the principle of effectiveness if
such organisations were not also allowed to rely on the
120. See Slovak Bears, supra note 117, 1 43.
121. See id. T 37.






THE PERSISTENCE OF NATIONAL PECULIARITIES
impairment of rules of EU environment law solely on the
ground that those rules protect the public interest.127
Consistently, the CJEU held that EU law
precludes legislation which does not permit non-
governmental organisations promoting environmental
protection . . . , to rely before the courts, in an action
contesting a decision authorising projects "likely to have
significant effects on the environment" for the purposes
of [the EIA directive], on the infringement of a rule
flowing from EU environment law and intended to
protect the environment, on the ground that that rule
protects only the interests of the general public and not
the interests of individuals.128
Again, it has to be noted that the situation is far more complex than
the term "hierarchies" suggests. Germany is one of the most influential
Member States of the European Union. When the European Union
issues new legislation, German ministers have a say in the process.129 A
nuanced picture reveals that it is, however, far from clear what "the
German position" is after all. While the German government
negotiating the Aarhus Convention was opposed to or at least doubted
representative environmental action, the subsequent Green minister of
the environment promoted the project.o30 Intra-German conflicts about
whether the German approach needs modification are as much at stake
as hierarchical control via the CJEU. Past examples stiggest that open
conflicts resulting in enduring resistance by German courts or large
parts of legal scholarship are undesirable for Germany and the
European Union alike. Where the CJEU is concerned, critique has
become much more rigorous and outspoken in recent years.13 Even a
court as powerful as the CJEU will at some point have to seek support
of its judicature. It seems conceivable that the question of
127. Trianel, supra note 118, 46 (emphasis added).
128. Id. 50 (emphasis added) (quoting Directive 85/337/EEC, supra note 75, art. 1(1)).
129. After all, the European Council consists of national government representatives, cf.
Treaty on European Union, 2010 O.J. (C83), at 20, Art. 10: 'Vember States are
represented in the European Council by their Heads of State or Government and in the
Council by their governments, themselves democratically accountable either to their
national Parliaments, or to their citizens."
130. See Bunge, supra note 59; WIESINGER, supra note 59.
131. See generally DER EuGH IN DER KRITIK [THE ECJ IN THE Focus OF CRITICISM]
(Ulrich Haltern & Andreas Bergmann eds., 2012) (providing an overview of recent
criticism of the CJEU).
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representative environmental action turns into the focal point of these
broader confrontations.
In preparation of the CJEU Trianel decision, Advocate General
Elinor Sharpston provided her opinion in English (the official language
of the case had been German). In her opinion, AG Sharpston presented
all relevant German norms translated into English. 132 As shown above,
mere literal translation is probably not enough to understand the
historical context and the importance of these norms within the overall
framework of administrative judicial review. 133 Although such
translations are, without a doubt, necessary to enable international
courts to deliver their rulings, it can also be observed in other instances
that the translations unavoidably simplify, and sometimes even distort,
the national legal situation.134 This is not to argue that AG Sharpston's
opinion was distorting but to highlight the difficulty of presenting a very
complex web of relevant law in a few paragraphs and in a language
other than the original. AG Sharpston even thanked the German
government for background information.135 She limited her presentation
of the case to her personal understanding of the complex interplay of
German norms in German law.136 The complexities of German law
forced AG Sharpston to elaborate on the idea of "a right which protects
individuals" (yet another translation of "individual public right"), and
she seemed astonished by some of its implications.137 In the opinion,
seven paragraphs are dedicated to explaining "the legal situation in
Germany."138 The example, thus, shows the extent of information that is
needed for appropriate translations.
132. See Opinion of A.G. Sharpston, supra note 104.
133. See supra Part I.A..
134. See, e.g., Von Hannover v. Germany (Caroline 1), 2004 Eur. Ct. H.R. 294 (providing
a very rough and sketchy translation and discussion of the delicate doctrine of the general
personal right (Allgemeines Personlichkeitsrecht) as developed in German constitutional
court decisions over more than forty years).
135. Opinion of A.G. Sharpston, supra note 104, 1 29 ("The written observations of the
German Government have been helpful in clarifying the problem set out in the order for
reference.").
136. Id. ('The effect of this provision [VwGO § 42(2)] is, as I understand it.
(emphasis added)).
137. Id. 30 ("The court may exercise its powers of review even where administrative
bodies have a margin of discretion.") In light of the British Wednesbury's principle of
reasonableness, such a close inspection of administrative decisions by the courts must
seem very odd indeed to AG Sharpston. See Assoc. Provincial Picture Houses, supra note
37.
138. Opinion of A.G. Sharpston, supra note 104, at 29-35.
256
THE PERSISTENCE OF NATIONAL PECULIARITIES
C. Second Attempt at Translation
Following the Trianel judgment of the CJEU, new legislation was
drafted and issued in early April 2013. The new UmwRG omits the
requirement of an "impairment of an organisation's own rights" in the
new section 2:
(1) A German or foreign association . . . may, without
having to assert that its own rights have been violated,
file appeals in accordance with the [VwGO] against a
decision .. . if the association:
1. Asserts that a decision . . . violates statutory
provisions that protect the environment and
could be of importance for the decision;
2. Asserts that promotion of the objectives of
environmental protection in accordance with its
field of activity as defined in its bylaws is
affected by the decision . . ; and
3. Was entitled to participate in a procedure [in
specific environmental matters] and expressed
itself in that matter according to the applicable
statutory provisions or, contrary to the
applicable statutory provisions, was not given an
opportunity to express itself1 39
In section 2(5) of UmwRG, which regulates the merits of an action,
"impairment of a right" has been removed as a prerequisite as well. For
now, the major bone of contention has been removed from the UmwRG.
However, the new legislation has already been met with heavy
criticism regarding various new aspects, suggesting a gloomy picture of
139. See Gesetz Ober erganzende Vorschriften zu Rechtsbehelfen in
Umweltangelegenheiten nach der EG-Richtlininie 2003/35/EG [Law on Supplementary
Rules to Appeals in Environmental Matters According to the EC Directive 2003/35/EG],
Umwelt-Rechtsbehelfsgesetz [UmwRG] [Environmental Appeals Act], Apr. 8, 2013, BGBL.
I at 753 (Ger.); see also ClientEarth Complaint, supra note 5, at Annex III: Clean Version
of the Consolidated Environmental Appeals Act, available at http://www.unece.org/filead
min/DAM/env/pp/compliance/C2008-
31/correspondence/frGER19Feb2013/Annex_III_UmwRGEnvironmentalAppeals.Act
Jan2013_clean.pdf (providing an English translation of the Jan. 21, 2013 promulgation of
the UmwRG).
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yet another condemning CJEU decision to come.140 Especially
questionable is the regulation of procedural mistakes. Currently,
procedural mistakes are only put under judicial scrutiny under a
plausibility test, which is probably not strict enough. 141 According to
section 4a(1) of UmwRG, environmental NGOs have to substantiate
their actions within six weeks-a period of time shorter than usual in
administrative judicial proceedings.1 42 The deadline will probably prove
to be very difficult to meet as environmental projects often involve
complex technical questions.143 Section 2(3) of UmwRG has also become
a hotly debated regulation, as it precludes NGOs from judicial review if
the NGO -has not raised its concerns in the administrative processes
prior to decision making.144
On another front line, current judgments of German administrative
courts strongly disagree about whether environmental NGOs can
directly rely upon Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention.145 As Article
9(3) has not yet been translated into EU law or German law, the
translation, answer is of the essence for the success or failure of actions
brought by NGOs.
All these problems can essentially be traced back to the German
concept of "individual public right": resistance and nonacceptance
hinder smooth implementation of both the Aarhus Convention and
relevant EU law into German law. Of course, this is a very rough
description. In fact, there are progressive statements, which argue for
ways to fit protection of the environment into the individual rights
approach.146 The controversies also have a history dating back at least
140. See Schlacke, supra note 95.
141. Id. at 198-99.
142. Usually, an incomplete action has to be substantiated on the court's request
according to section 82(2) of VwGO. The court sets "an adequate period of time." By
contrast, the period of six weeks provided for in § 4a(1) of UmwRG as per sentence 2
allows the court to preclude further substantiation of the action according to § 87b(3) of
VwGO.
143. Schlacke, supra note 95, at 200.
144. Id. at 202.
145. The cosmos of court decisions has, for the most part, been neglected in this article;
it would very well justify another article. Compare Verwaltungsgericht Augsburg [VG
Augsburg] [Administrative Trial Court of Augsburg] Feb 2, 2013, docket number Au 2 S
13.143 (Ger.) (finding for direct applicability), available at http://www.gesetze-
bayern.de/jportal/portal/pagelbsbayprod.psml?doc.id=JURE130004078&st=ent&showdocc
ase=l&paramfromHL-true, with Oberverwaltungsgericht Rheinland-Pfalz [OVG
Rheinland-Pfalz] [Higher Administrative Court of Rheinland-Pfalz] Feb. 27, 2013, docket
number 8 B 10254/13.OVG (Ger.) (finding against direct applicability), available at
https://www.jurion.de/Urteile/OVG-Rheinland-Pfalz/2013-02-27/8-B-10254_130VG.
146. See generally JULIAN KROJPER, GEMEINWOHL IM PROZESS: ELEMENTE EINES
FUNKTIONALEN SUBJEKTIVEN RECHTS AUF UMWELTVORSORGE [COMMON GOOD IN JUDICIAL
REvIEW: ELEMENTS OF A FUNCTIONAL INDIVIDUAL RIGHT TO ENVIRONMENTAL
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to the late 1980s when the influences of (then) European Community.
law started to grow and the traditional individual rights approach came,
under attack.147 As always with historical narratives, they are not
straightforward but characterized by "simultaneity of the non-
simultaneous" ("Gleichzeitigkeit des Ungleichzeitigen').148 However, one
can say that in Germany, reluctance and, at times, resistance vis-A-vis
representative environmental action, have had the upper hand.
IV. CONCLUSION: CHARACTERISTIC FEATURES OF LEGAL TRANSLATIONS
. In summarizing the findings of this article, characteristic features of
legal translations appear.
A. Contextual Translation
First of all, it has to be noted that legal regulations do not happen in
a vacuum. Every legal regulation, be it a single norm, an act of
legislation, or a whole regulatory system, is situated in a specific
context. German administrative judicial review has developed over time
in a specific and rather peculiar way. This development finally led to the
"individual public right," which can be described as one of the central
features of German public law, especially after 1945, when it was
strengthened by a constitutional provision guaranteeing judicial review
against acts of public authority.149 Because regulations do not exist
PRECAUTION] (2009) (drawing on expertise from various academic fields, e.g., sociology
and political philosophy, and arguing for a "functional individual right to environmental
precaution" ("funktional subjektives Recht auf Umweltvorsorge," quotation translated by
the author here)).
147. Compare BERNHARD W. WEGENER, RECHTE DES EINZELNEN: DIE
INTERESSENTENKLAGE IM EUROPAISCHEN UMWELTRECHT [RIGHTS OF THE INDIVIDUAL:
ACTION OF INTERESTED PARTIES IN EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW] (Jflrgen Schwarze
ed., 1998) (Ger.) (arguing for an acceptance of the changes induced by EC law), with
MATTIAS RUFFERT, SUBJEKTIVE RECHTE TM UMWELTRECHT DER EUROPAISCHEN
GEMEINSCHAFT: UNTER BESONDERER BEROCKSICHTIGUNG IHRER PROZESSUALEN
DURCHSETZUNG [INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN EUROPEAN COMMUNITY ENVIRONMENTAL LAW:
WITH PARTIcULAR REGARD TO THEIR JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT] (1996) (Ger.) (taking a
decidedly national legal perspective), and JOHANNES MASING, DIE MOBILISIERUNG DES
BORGERS FOR DIE DURCHSETZUNG DES RECHTS: EUROPAISCHE IMPULSE FUR EINE REVISION
DER LEHRE VOM SUBJEKTIV-OFFENTLICHEN RECHT [THE MOBILIZATION OF THE CITIZEN FOR
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF LAw: EUROPEAN IMPULSES FOR A REVISION OF THE THEORY OF
THE INDIVIDUAL PUBLIC RIGHT] (1997) (Ger.) (taking an intermediate position).
148. See ERNST BLOCH, ERBScHArr DIESER ZEIT [INHERITANCE OF THIS TIME] (1935)
(Ger.).
149. See WAHL, supra note 25, at 23; Christoph Schbnberger, Verwaltungsrecht als
konkretisiertes Verfassungsrecht [Administrative Law as Concretized Constitutional Law],
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independently, translations between legal regulations have . to
acknowledge the specific contexts of regulations. To do so, these contexts
have to be known.
B. Translation in Hierarchy and Under Control
The second aspect of translations between legal regulations
concerns the complex, and at times, hierarchical relationships between
different legal spheres. International law is binding to signatory parties,
and yet, effective enforcement mechanisms are often a problem. EU law
obliges EU Member States to change their respective domestic laws to
eliminate conflicts; a powerful and efficient court, the Court of Justice of
the European Union, exists to determine contested cases. Germany is
both a party to the Aarhus Convention and a founding Member State of
the European Union and, thus, is under dual obligation to implement
both international and EU law. However, Germany adheres to its
national legal peculiarities (and thus-as some argue-to its
sovereignty), which inevitably leads to conflicts with the enforcement
bodies of the other levels involved. Germany itself is a political player at
both the international and the supranational level, sometimes not even
talking with one voice but with the voices of different actors playing a
double game.
C. Literal Translation as Basis for Legal Translations
A third and last feature of legal translations is the literal
translation as an essential basis. The relations between different
environmental legal regulations in the international realm, at the
European Union level, and in German public law all need to be literally
translated to become transferable and legally translatable. In the case
of international and EU law, different language versions of the relevant
legislation exist, all of which are authoritative and binding. Also, in
proceedings of international courts and committees, German law
requires translation (mostly into English) to enable the very
proceedings.
D. The Persistence of National Peculiarities
This article has delineated multiple interwoven processes of
translation between regulations in international, supranational, and
in DAs BONNER GRUNDGESETZ [THE BONN CONSTITUTION] 53, 71-76 (Michael Stolleis ed.,
2006) (Ger.).
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national law. The process of translating both the Aarhus Convention
and EU law into German law has proven to be very complex. Both the
Aarhus Convention and EU law leave it to the parties/Member States to
implement either a "sufficient interest" approach or an "impairment of a
right" approach. Thus, translators are provided with leeway on
Germany's insistence. Whether this leeway is used appropriately is not
always clear; it certainly leads to controversies both within and outside
Germany. Nevertheless, the finding of this article is clear: Germany's
"individual public right" as a national peculiarity persists and must not
be neglected in legal translations. The example shows that such
national peculiarities cannot easily be overcome or abandoned. Rather,
they continue to play a significant role in transnational law.

